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Theory and the Generation
and Subversion of Knowledge
DENNIS SALEEBEY
The University of Kansas
School of Social Welfare

This essay is an argument for the refurbishing of theoretical thinking in
social work. In particular, the author calls for the infusion of generative
as opposed to normative theory in the profession. Only generative theory
has been proven to invigorate the thinking and doing of professional
social workers.
The current debate in the social work academy about positivist versus more heuristic approaches to knowledge development is clearly an epistemological struggle that, more often than
not, hinges on concerns about method and methodology (Fischer, 1981; Gordon, 1983; Heineman [Pieper], 1981). Certainly
in epistemological inquiry method must be of interest but it
should not be, as it has turned out here, a singular obsession.
Method, and the data that it may help us accumulate, is not
synonymous with meaning, does not add up to understanding or even, except in the merest sense of the word, learning.
Jeffrey Alexander (1983b) in his massive four-volume critique
and exposition of the current state of sociological theory and
governing theoretical logic puts it this way in decrying the sway
of methodology over theory:
The crucial proposition of the positivist persuasion ... is the belief
that factual statements can be ontologically separated from nonfactual statements or generalizations. From this central tenet other
components of the positivist persuasion inevitably follow: the
notions that philosophical or metaphysical issues play no essential
part in a true empirical science, that theoretical disputes must be
decided by reference to crucial empirical experiments alone, that
methodological techniques of verification or falsification are of
critical and ultimate importance. In opposition to these positivist
tendencies, I suggested that general as well as specific thinking
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is crucial to science, and I defined this "theoretical" ... logic as
the concern with the effects of more general assumptions on the more
specific formulations (p. xiv).

Theory is not only a critical element in the advance of thinking
in a particular discipline or profession, but it is absolutely essential, as Alexander argues, to method; without theory method
makes little sense, and has little relevance in addressing compelling questions about the human condition.
This essay is an argument for reinstating theory into the
epistemological debates in which social work is embroiled, as
well as a plea for the particular poignance of generative theory
over normative theory. Once a discipline or profession has
decided that philosophical and theoretical issues are too far
removed from the exigencies of life, and once empirical observation has become reasonably problem-free, then most practice
issues and questions will inevitably be decided by method. At
that point, theory becomes relatively useless to a profession,
and what theory might conceivably arise out of this positivist,
inductive scenario is, in the end driven by method, not conception, not value, not urgency, and certainly not philosophy. This
"normative" view of theory, it will be contended, is inadequate
for illuminating the concerns of the social work profession.
Alberto Guerreiro Ramos (1984), in his attempt to revive
organization theory, makes the distinction between normative
theory and science, and what he calls the substantive view. The
former, regnant over social science, is "scientistic... it assumes
that the correct model of reality can only be articulated according to the ...technical language of natural science" (p. 40). He
goes on to maintain that a "sound argument against (normative) science. . . simply asserts that method and technique are
not standards of truth and proper scientific knowledge.... To
consider this mode of knowing as the paradigm of knowledge
in all realms of reality is precisely what Whitehead called the
'fallacy of misplaced concreteness'" (p. 40).
The Necessity of Theory
If method is insufficient as a means for revealing, shaping,
or informing the world of language and action and if the accumulation of methodically derived fact will not add up to
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knowledge, truth, reality, or understanding, maybe even not
interest, then it behooves us to carefully examine the nature
and role of theory. The other side of this coin is that probably
no methodological entre into the world of experience is without
presumption or "theory," anyway, although usually implicit.
Theory can be formally defined. The prototypical definition
in social science is probably Robert Merton's:
It is only when concepts are interrelated (my emphasis) in the form
of a scheme that a theory begins to emerge. Concepts, then, constitute the definitions (or prescriptions) of what is to be observed;
they are the variables between which empirical generalizations
are to be sought. When propositions are logically interrelated, a
theory has been instituted (1957, p. 89).
The task of the theorist is to explain and account for relationships between empirical generalizations, usually at a higher
level of abstraction. An empirical generalization, which may or
may not have theoretical pertinence, is a proposition which asserts, thanks to replicated observation, a consistent relationship
between at least two variables. Frequently mistaken for model,
concept or even empirical generalization, it is theory's work to
explain the relationships between seemingly isolated empirical
generalizations at a more abstract level of conceptualization.
The classical example often referred to in the sociological
literature is Emile Durkheim's theory of suicide (Greenwood,
1960; Merton, 1957). Durkheim's initial observations revealed
a number of puzzling uniformities (empirical generalizations):
Protestants have more suicides than Catholics; unmarried individuals more than the married; urban dwellers more than rural.
The quest for explanatory devices for these empirical generalizations led Durkheim (1951) to the concepts of social integration
(cohesion, richness of social relationships) and individualism.
He eventually constructed a theory of suicide out of this and
other conceptual material, posing the central formulation of the
theory as: "suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration of social groups" (p. 209). This ultimately yielded three
kinds of suicide-altruistic, egoistic, and anomic, all variants
of the differing relationships between degrees of solidarity and
individualism.
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Once having established the theoretic pertinence of a uniformity
(e.g. the suicide rate differential) by deriving it from a set of
interrelated propositions provide for the cumulation both of theory
and research findings. The differentials-in-suicide rate uniformities
add confirmation to the set of propositions from which they, and
other uniformities, have been derived. This is a major function of
systematic theory (Merton, 1957, p. 97).

Although Merton seems of two minds about the function
of more general and sweeping theories (at one time suggesting
they yield theoretical insights and help clarify the relationship
between concepts; at another arguing that they are too remote
from the reality of behavior), he has consistently promoted
the value of "theories of the middle-range" which focus on
"verifiable statements of relationships between specified variables"
(Alexander, 1983a). Perhaps the best examples of theories of
this scope exist in social psychology: attribution, cognitive dissonance, reactance, and reference group theories.
Thomas Kuhn (1970) has argued that if you want to get at
the gist of "normal science" (i.e., the prevailing views of method
and instrumentation, of theory and theory-building in a given
discipline or area of investigation) look to the textbooks that
"scientist-to-be" (or practitioners-to-be, we might add) read. Let
us, then, turn to one representative text used to teach research
to social science and social work students, Nachmias and Nachmias' Research Methods in the Social Sciences (1987) to see what
they have to say about theory in normal social science.
A theoretical system is one that provides a structure for the
complete explanation of empirical phenomena ....

A theoreti-

cal system... consists of a set of propositions, that is, statements
of relationships between two or more empirical properties that
can be verified or refuted: such a set of propositions forms a
deductive system ... (and) some propositions are deduced from

others... (and) they are said to be explained as well as to provide
predictions ... (p. 43).

Thus, the normative approach to theory is that it explains
relationships in a systematic way, between discrete groups of
uniformities that, without theory, would seem to stand in no
relationship to each other. Theory yields propositions which
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can be tested in the real world for their correspondence with
observable data.
The problems with theory as ordinarily understood are
many. First, many schemes identified as such are not theory,
even by the normative definition. They are instead empirical
generalizations ("Morale among older new residents in public
housing is initially lower than among younger new residents"),
conceptual frameworks ("We can look at a football game as
an interactive tension between the catharses of instrumental,
playful aggression and the stimulation of malignant aggression);
models (the "systems" approach), or post hoc inferences about
sets of facts ("The rise of admissions into schools of social work
during the Reagan Administration is more an effect of joblessness in other sectors rather than optimism about the future of
social service").
A second problem with theory, as Alexander (1983a)
contends, is that after the Grand Theorists-Marx, Weber,
Durkheim, Pareto, et al.-theory development, in sociology, has
flagged, the central reason being the reduction of the concerns of
theory to exclusively empirical preoccupations (method, design,
statistical and logical analysis, instrumentation). This fuels the
delusion that methodological rigor ultimately adds up to theoretical relevance. Alexander (1983a) constructs a continuum
of kinds of scientific thought-all of them requisite parts of
the scientific enterprise-ranging from the most general, the
metaphysical environment, to the most particular, the empirical
environment. At the metaphysical end we find modes of thought
from general presuppositions to models, and then concepts
stretching to the empirical end, where we find correlations,
methodological assumptions and, last, observation. Those elements at the general end might be lumped together as "theory"
and those at the narrower end as method (and data). A common
mistake is to assume the qualitative discreteness of elements
of thinking along the continuum, or that the elements of the
empirical environment alone constitute legitimate science.
Every piece of actual scientific analysis contains implicit references
to, and is at least influenced by, each of the other analytic levels
of scientific thought. What appears concretely to be a difference in
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Figure 1
The scientific continuum and its components
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Note. From Theoretical Logic in Sociology, Vol. I (p. 3) by J. C. Alexander, 1983a,
Berkeley: University of California Press. Copyright 1983 by University of California
Press. Reprinted by permission.

types of scientific statements-models, definitions, propositionssimply reflects the different emphasis within a given statement on
generality of specificity (Alexander, 1983a, p. 4).
Given this, social science has failed in the development of
a logic and a methodology of generalization that compels it
to move from the empirical all the way to the metaphysical
and back again, to develop understanding of phenomena at
all levels of thinking. Without such a discipline we are fated
to experience a foofaraw of isolated data, and methodological
nitpicking. With no means of evaluating the struggle between
theoretical propositions that goes beyond appeals to data ("Let
the facts speak for themselves"!) we can only develop a Babel
of ultimately meaningless data.
Another problem with theory-there isn't much. Consider
social work. Historically, we have claimed to: (a) translate social
science theories for employment in social work practice, and less
frequently, (b) develop practice theories out of the observations
and evaluations of practice. In actual fact, little translation is
in evidence. Even in the case of theories of psychotherapy and
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human behavior, most are imported wholesale and with little
modification to the unique social purposes and ethical infrastructure of social work. Instructive in this case are two current
"theories" that have their roots in other disciplines but are
widely used in social work texts: systems theory and ecological
theory. The first question to be asked is: Are they in fact theories? Or are they models, conceptual schemes, or metaphors?
Second: how do they orient the practitioner to her world?
Of course, it is unfair to characterize a corpus of enormous size in a few sentences and then critique it. What is
intended here is merely suggestive. A widely used textbook
in social work education, reputed to have already sold, in its
three editions, more than 100,000 copies is based on the systems
approach (Anderson and Carter, 1984). The authors open their
discussion of systems with sociologist Marvin Olsen's observation that the systems approach is not a theory but a model
and as a model it provides housing for any number of theories.
Fair enough, if theories can analytically be transformed into
either the language or metaphor of systems. A review of the
chapters-on culture, communities, organizations, groups, families, and the person-reveals that, in this book, there is little
integration of systems thinking with the theories and empirical
generalizations that are presented. The point? Unless one is willing to cast every dimension of natural and social living in the
language of systems as James Miller (1978) has done in Living
Systems, this model (perhaps, any model) offers very little of
resonance to the practitioner or learner. How has, for example,
systems thinking infused and extended Carter and Anderson's
discussion of Piaget and Erikson? Very little is seems. What
might have been a vehicle for the integration and recasting
of some theoretical notions has had only superficial impact on
them. Models are pale imitations of life, and the systems model
is especially so. In the absence of vigorous theorizing, models
rush in to fill the gap but, except in remarkable cases, they
cannot do the job. Compare, for example, the challenge to, and
elaboration of developmental theory authored by Carol Gilligan
(1982), its richness and generativity, with Anderson and Carter's
systemic treatment (I recognize that it is unfair to compare a
small section of one book with an entire book devoted to the
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same subject but I merely want to contrast the potency of one
with the other).
Finally, a long-standing critique of normative social theory
("normal science") is that it supports and rationalizes the existing moral, social, and political order, and thus, orients the
user to the world of conventional wisdom. Sociology, for example, via the manifold versions of its reigning theory, structural/functionalism, and its supporting methods and morality,
reflects the limited aims of a welfare state run by and for the
middle class and driven by an implicit ethic of utilitarianism
(Gouldner, 1970, pp. 61-87). Recently, Russell Jacoby (1987)
reported that a sociologist, Patricia Wilner, had surveyed the
official organ of academic sociology, American Sociological Review, expecting over a 45-year period (1936-1982) to find articles and studies grappling with, clarifying, and informing the
knotty issues of the day, from the cold war and McCarthyism
to the civil rights movement and social protest. Less than 5.1%
of the articles addressed such topics. The favorite subject of
the sociologists? Mate selection (p. 158). Perhaps that reflects
Gouldner's acerbic and sexist observation, "In loyalty tinged
with bitterness, most [sociologists] stick it out to the end with
wives who saw them through graduate school..." (1970, p. 57).
Ecological theory, a variant of systems, has arisen as a new
"hope" in developing a broadly based theory to undergird social
work practice by defining its spheres of interest, foci of intervention, and the range of permissible and possible outcomes.
People, like all living organisms, together with their environment
form an ecosystem in which each shapes the other.... In these
complex transactions between people and environments, upsets
in the usual adaptive balance or goodness-of-fit often emerge.
These upsets create stress. In our conception of the life model, we
treat stress as a psycho-social condition generated by discrepancies
between needs and capacities, on the one hand, and environmental
qualities on the other. It arises in three interrelated areas of living:
life transitions, environmental pressures, and interpersonal processes"
(Germain and Gitterman, 1980, pp. 6-7).
More prescriptive and focused than systems models, ecological approaches, too, are translations in which the normative
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views of the world, the conventional idiom are recast in a more
neutral, less indicative language. Translation is suspect when
dressed in the new lexicon, it simply appropriates traditional
and normative understandings of the world. Normative here
may refer to either the larger society's conventions or those
traditions of the given profession or discipline. Of course, the
conventions of profession and society frequently intersect. But
the essential focus of ecological thinking is on how individuals
adapt to environmental demands. While there is talk of changing
environments, the message of the ecological approach in general
is that, in many cases, it is the client(s) who will have adapt:
"the transactional emphasis of the ecological perspective fosters
individually oriented interventions directed towards promoting
personal competencies for dealing with environmental blocks to
achieving personal objectives" (Holahan, Wilcox, Spearly, and
Campbell, 1979, p. 8). In her feminist critique of the ecological
model, Gould (1987) argues: "One of the most important limitations of the life model ... is its overestimation of the role of

purpose and its underestimation of the role of power in human
change" (p. 348). The realities of power, conflict, oppression, and
violence, so central to the survival of many groups, are given a
curious and unreal patina by the adaptation perspective.
While it would be difficult to draw any hard and fast conclusions from such a cursory review of the problems of normative
theory, two come immediately to mind: Disciplines, whether
practice-oriented like social work or research-dominated like
psychology, seem to have a declining interest in theorizing,
or in the metaphysical issues and symbolic foundations of the
discipline (language, imagery, values, and ethics). The decline
of theorizing may end in a dangerous thwarting of critical
thinking, a fateful reduction in the pursuit of answers to fundamental questions by which a profession is energized, chastened,
emboldened, and revised.
Joel Fischer (1981) heralds, inadvertently, the danger:
The necessity for basing practice on empirical knowledge and for
utilizing a range of effective techniques that may be adopted from
several different approaches bespeaks the need to re-evaluate the
conceptual basis of practice. The major alternative to traditional
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practice grounded in particular theories of practice (my emphasis)
is the development of an eclectic approach to practice made up
of a variety of empirically derived and validated principles and
procedures (p. 203).

Second, much of what passes for theory not only lacks
interest by denudes the complexity, richness, volubility, and
conflicts of modern societies (as well as the elegance of modern professional practice.) Gouldner (1970) observes, as an example, that is Talcott Parson's massive tome, The Structure of
Social Action, a total of five pages are devoted to the problem
of violence and aggression. It is, then, little wonder that few
academicians, and practitioner-academicians have substantial
investments sunk in theory.
Generative Theory.
The term "generative theory" is Kenneth Gergen's (1983).
Gergen is a social psychologist with impeccable and seemingly appropriate "normative" credentials. That is, he has conducted empirical research, contributed to a body of theory
(developmental-personality), and has even written a popular
introductory text in psychology. But, over time, he has voiced
some of the concerns reviewed above and recently has expressed some dismay over the way that theory is typically
conceived, as well as some wonder at the gap between the elements of social life as we experience them and as psychological,
behavioral science theory describes and elucidates them.
Most everybody these days seems to agree that theories are
cognitive products that we impose upon nature; stories that we
tell about reality. The rift seems to be over the nature of the
reality these conceptions bespeak. Sir Karl Popper (1982), examining the influence of quantum theory in physics, expresses
the realistic view of the relationship between theory and reality:
Thus theories are our own inventions, our own ideas: this has
been clearly seen by the epistemological idealists. But some of
these theories are so bold that they can clash with reality: they
are the testable theories of science. And when they clash, then we
know there is a reality: something that can inform us that our ideas are
mistaken. And this is why the realist is right (p. 3).
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Gergen departs from the realist view. He contends that
what human beings are doing all the time, whether conversing,
building a theory, conducting an experiment, making a business
decision, or wooing a lover, in both sacred and profane contexts,
is engaging in discourse, establishing linguistic conventions,
both constructing as well as construing a reality that satisfies,
protects, interests, and is palpable and plausible. In other words,
much of daily life is spent proposing and testing theories to
figure out what is happening, what we will do, and what,
in fact, did happen. Over time, some of our stories become
collectivized, become conventions that are institutionalized and
create the basis for individual motives, desires, and orientations
to the world. We, scientists and lay person alike, are in the
business of developing languages of understanding, themes and
patterns of discourse, and that is how we construct our world,
making it resonant and reducing chaos and surprise (Gergen,
1983, pp. 93-106).
From a generative point of view, normative theory and its
empirical research program are not themselves really divorced
from this subjunctivity of human life. The desire to explain, predict, and control in a methodical and rational way, in its fashion,
is similar to what we all do in creating meaning, however tentative. Those who conduct research are also deeply ensconced
in particular sociohistorical contexts, and the concerns, values,
presumptions, and linguistic conventions of the era imbue their
work. The obverse is true, as well. The scientist is an active agent
whose opinions, statements, and theories influence patterns of
conduct, values, even the discourse and colloquies of everyday
life. It is quite common now for experts of every sort to appear
on media talk shows to tell us what to make of wife-battering or
saturated fat or Mikhail Gorbachev or punk rock. For example,
Stanley Milgram's (1974) 10 years of research on obedience to
authority, by all accounts elegant and scientifically respectable
even if ethically controversial, was widely disseminated (a TV
movie was made about it, for example), and changed for those
who were familiar with it the way they considered obedience,
how they valued it, and, not insignificantly, what it meant.
In many social circles, obedience was once regarded as a civil
virtue. Thanks to Milgram, the evaluation of obedient behavior
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is more difficult and in some corners the obedient may even be
regarded with suspicion.
However, in the virtual absence of vigorous and generous
theorizing, much but not all (e.g. Milgram) of the program and
discipline of the social sciences has narrowed, become methodologically precious, of interest only to cognoscenti, having little
lasting or broad impact on society, politics, and culture, or,
in the case of social practice, the disciplines of assessing and
intervening. Of course, the prevailing attitude in the scientific
enterprise would appreciate that: What we should be doing is
fine tuning and focusingour knowledge of discrete phenomena.
But what we are also doing is turning our backs on the great
urgencies and aspirations of the early social theorist-the search
for an "anthropodicy"; the explanation of evil and alienation
in human life, and a basis for the development of plans and
visions for the resurrection of the human spirit. Ernest Becker
(1968) put it this way:
The science of man [sic] in society must be a superordinate value
science; on which has opted for human progress, and which has
a clear and comprehensive, compelling idea of what constitutes
such progress. The task of such a science would be the incessant
implementation of human well-being (p. xiii).
Such an ideal would be a product of the achievement of a thoroughgoing theory of human alienation (which Becker believed
we already had in immanence and which he devoted his life
to vivifying).
The great theories of our immediate past, those that dwarf
our efforts today-Marx, Freud, Weber, Mumford, etc.-were
not simply theories to be tested but were explicit and implicit critiques of convention and social order, and had within
them proposals for reform, revision, or revolution (Becker,
1968, pp. 33-67; Gergen, 1983, pp. 107-108; Gouldner, 1970,
pp. 87-102; Jacoby, 1987, pp. 3-26). In the end, however, it is
not the scope of these theories that should bedazzle us, it is
instead that these theorists were literate, they generated discourse, controversy, and contravening notions about the nature
of society, the relationship of the individual to society, and the
meaning of history. Today, academia-bound intellectuals "share
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and idiom and a discipline. Gathering in annual conferences
to compare notes, they constitute their own universe" (Jacoby,
1987, p. 7). Generative theory creates doubt and sheds light;
normative theory promises certainty, and narrows its beam.
In his thoughtful article on theoretical (and methodological)
pluralism, John Brekke (1986) advocates for the ideas of Imre
Lakatos as the basis for developing criteria for selecting one
theory over another. These criteria involve a kind of generation:
That is, how much more knowledge can a new theory generate
compared to a more established one? How much more of the
real world -will be revealed? How much of contending theories
can be accounted for in the terms of this theory? The problem
with Lakatos' criteria is that they depend on the assertion of
a real world that exists and can be known apart from human
subjectivity and subjunctivity, and they seem strangely aloof
from the concerns and conditions of everyday life. In Lakatos'
view, theory is progressive if it leads to new predictions. It is
empirically progressive if these conditions are verified experimentally. In essence, what Lakatos suggests is that, in spite
of hard-core commitments of a scientific program, that because
the world awaits discovery, scientific knowledge is cumulative,
and as it accumulates, brings us closer to the truth (Baker and
Gholson, 1984).
Generative theory, by contrast, joins with concerns about the
human condition within contemporary society and unabashedly
asserts its social interest.
Theoretical accounts (must) be compared in terms of generative
capacity, that is the capacity to challenge guidingassumptions of culture,
to raise fundamental questions regarding contemporary social life, to
foster reconsideration of that which is "taken for granted," and thereby
to generate fresh alternativesfor social action, (Gergen, 1983, p. 109).
Any theory "may truncate one's capacities for problem solving" (Gergen, 1983, p. 109) or put blinders on prophets, but the
value of generative theory is that it continually urges that need
to think anew, take a different perspective, develop a new discourse, a different structure of meaning. Two examples leap to
mind, though neither may have achieved the fullness of theory
yet. Carol Gilligan's (1982) challenge to the usual.psychosocial,
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cognitive accounts of human development reveals two things.
Existing theories of the lifespan are pretty much synonymous
with acceptable and reputable social wisdom. Furthermore, the
emendations of Gilligan make it clear that not only do the theories implicitly support current sexist notions but that they have
prevented us from seeing, over the past seven decades of such
theorizing, development in a different light. Is Gilligan right?
Who knows for sure? But she has initiated a new conversation,
new possibilities for meaning, revised exchanges between developmental thinkers, and she has upset the interaction between
developmental theory and social institutions and their keepers.
Out of such discourse "validity" will come: That is, we will
discuss how such thinking affects the way we raise children,
the morality of parenthood, and our notions of male and female
identities, and the possibilities for revising action and policy
that may follow. Not the least of the effects of such thinking,
for example, would be to raise the status of connectedness
and caring to debatable moral and social issues (Davis, 1985;
Rhodes, 1985).
Weick's (1983; 1986; 1987) efforts to challenge the basic presumptions of the social work academy, and profession in their
search for a knowledge base has generative qualities. Her work
focuses upon the waning power and frail human relevance of
an empiricist/positivist epistemology for the profession and
its supporting "sciences." By searching other fields in turmoil
(physics, health, biological structuralism, for example) she seeks
to develop means of inquiry, frames of presumption that turn
us toward the novel, the whole ("web of relationships"), and
the transformational to which we, as a profession, claim to
be committed.
I will begin by looking at the social work belief in the transformational capacity of individuals. The use of the word "transformation" signals an interesting shift in language. The term is
commonly used in holistic health and the new psychologies to
express a belief in the inherent capacity of human beings to engage
in fundamental personal and social change. It connotes an interior
ability that stands in sharp contrast to the more traditional notion
of an externally stimulated or socially created ability (1987, p. 224).
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The idea of generative theory and implicit in both Gilligan's
and Weick's work is that we do not need to brush another
theoretical patina on the surface of official "reality." What we require are telling perspectives that open our eyes, draw attention,
direct us to new pathways and novel possibilities.
The Two Qualities of Generative Theory: Critique and Narrative
Critique. The essence of generative theory, for Gergen, is the
power it has to render part of the social world intelligible in
a way that exceeds the conventional wisdom, and extends the
reach and possibility of the relevant social groups. A generative
theory must create doubt about the current constructions of
the world, especially narrow, univocal, and stultifying ones
(pp. 167-169). In this sense, insight or intelligibility is a function of systematic, mutually authored social critique (Saleebey,
1987; Walzer, 1987). Such generative re-interpretations should
not only give us reason to examine existing social institutions,
cultural forms, political ideologies, and moral imperatives (as
well as existing social and practice theory) but they should
also at least imply or, better yet, fully enunciate alternative
plans and programs for individual and collective life (Gergen,
1983, pp. 169-170). Since social change (in the sense of human
betterment) is at stake here, the relationship of value to theory becomes critical and obvious; theories exist, unwittingly or
deliberately, to sustain and promulgate values or to challenge
them. Attachment theories of early human development implicitly uphold, for example, the value of the continual presence
and emotional involvement of the mother in the early months
and years of the child's development and raise doubt, in some
instances, about the capacity of other caretakers to encourage attachment behaviors and provide bonding-promoting responses
(Bowlby, 1969). To carry this a step further, they may also raise
doubt about some child care ventures outside the home.
If, then, the function of theories is to provide the basis for
alternative views and practices what is to prevent a cacophony
of theoretical voices from drowning our sensibilities? The fact
that knowledge and rationality are products of interpersonal
negotiation, debate, dialectic, and dialogue is one protection.
We decide what theories prevail because we have concluded
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together that they provide more interest, open up other ways
of interpreting phenomena that generate new alternatives of inquiry and action, clarify difficult moral and ethical choices, and
create new meanings. Theories do not discover new knowledge.
They give us an amended or fresh lexicon and grammar with
which to discourse about ordinary and extraordinary events,
structures and relationships. They also pose new alternatives
for social and individual action. Their rationality, their value,
their humanity, in the end, is judged in dialogue and praxis.
Narrative.Jerome Bruner (1986), perhaps the real inspiration
for the reviving of cognitive theory in this country and Europe,
describes two modes of knowing-argument and story, or the
paradigmatic (the current, scientific/ positivist world-view), and
the poetic or narrative (p. 11). The two manners of knowing
are, in his view, complementary but irreducibly different. Arguments convince us of the truth; stories imbue life with meaning.
What either can tell us about human nature and the human
condition is problematic. Science, the paradigmatic, attempts to
"make a world that is invariant across human intentions and
plights.., on the other had the humanist deals principally with
the world as it changes with the position and stance of the
viewer" (p. 50).
Narrative succeeds or has interest because it deals with
"subjunctivities,"-the worlds of human possibility-and because of its sensitivity to shifting and varied contexts of human
consciousness and interaction. Argument, or science, succeeds
as it demonstrates context independence and persistence (p. 50).
Precisely what this implies is not clear. But one might make
the case the "science" can tell us about the non-subjunctive
world, a world bereft of cognitive intent, that it can inform us
about parameters of the social world that we shape with our
consciousness. For example, we can be enlightened about:
How many people are suffering from A.I.D.S. and what socioeconomic, ethnic, and cultural groups are "over-represented" (although designation of these groups can be a figurative problem)?
How many children are sexually abused by a same-sexed parent?
What people say about the coming presidential election in terms
of who they will likely vote for and why, and so forth?
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This sounds like pretty routine stuff-banal, even. W.V.O.
Quine said in his review of Nelson Goodman's Way of World
Making, that physical theory is preponderantly conceptualization, even poetry, and very limitedly, observation (Bruner, 1986,
p. 100). Science as method brings us the mundane and that is a
small part of the epistemological enterprise. Generative theory
weaves a literate fabric of understanding and interpretation.
So we have come full circle. The data do not tell us the
story; the method does not bring us closer, in most cases, to
human "reality." Normative theory abhors the novel, supports
the conventional, and sustains an epistemology of adjustment
and adaptation that is increasingly hard to rationalize. What we
seek is theory, a story, a narrative that makes our world resonant and intelligible. Not just our professional world, but our
personal world as well because the two unite as we construct
an interesting interpretation of our circumstances. Bruner (1986)
provides words to close our case with:
If I have, then, made much of the contingent and subjunctive not
so much in story-telling as in story apprehending, it is because
that narrative mode leads to conclusions not about certainties in
an aboriginal world but about varying perspectives that can be
constructed to make experience comprehensible (p. 37).
Conclusion: Generative Theory in Social Work
Generative theory is both requisite and possible in the profession of social work. there are at least three reasons for this.
First, the nature of practice, as we have construed it in the
"normative" sense: That is, the professional as an applied scientist, or technologist wielding principles and techniques deduced
and derived from scientific theory-probably has very little to
do with what professionals actually do. If this is the case, then
normative definitions of theory (and practice) tend to draw
the professional (and the educator for the professions) off the
mark. That may explain in part why there is often such a gap
of relevance between academicians and practitioners. Donald
Schon (1983), along with Chris Argyris (1978), has studied the
nature of professional knowing and doing for many years. In
his words:
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In the varied topography of professional practice, there is the high
hard ground where practitioners can make use of research-based
theory and technique, and there is the swampy lowland where
situations are confusing "messes" incapable of technical solution.
The difficulty is that the problem of the high ground, however
great their technical interest, are often relatively unimportant to
clients or the larger society, while in the swamp are problems of
greatest human concern (p. 12).

If the bulk of what practitioners do is in reality's bog, then
normative theories may be of relatively little value to them,
and generative theory, formed of the shared experiences and
dialogues between practitioners and clients, and between practitioners and academicians might, in fact, have more value, be
more democratic, more provisional, and take many more shapes
and forms depending on the shifting contexts of practice.
Second, the ethical and historical traditions of social work
profession would seem to make the impulses and orientation of
generative theory ideal. Social work, in the pursuit of social
justice, fired by an ethic of indignation, and absorbed with
the plight of the vulnerable, the disadvantaged and disenfranchised, would seem to be a particularly hospitable environment
for the development of interpretations designed to restore a
critical and productive alternative perspectives on social "reality." It is still true, protestations to the contrary, that normative
theory supports a conservative professional regimen: adaptation and adjustment to the environment, and restrained social
change and challenge. Whether or not social work's current
disengagement from vulnerable populations is an effect of the
infusion of the weltanschauung of normal science or whether
the disengagement is the cause of such infusion is uncertain;
the more generative view (in the sense that it will cause us
to reconsider seriously the place of "science" in social work
education, research, and practice) supports the latter hypothesis.
In any case, there is ample historical and ontological reason to
embrace a generative approach. As Habermas (1970), Marcuse
(1966), Mumford (1970), Barrett (1976), Freire (1973), and others
(Foucault, 1980) have shown us, knowledge and method can
either oppress or liberate. It is in the nature of the normative
view of science and technology, through the methodological
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requisites of distantiation and manipulation, the mandate of
expertise and exclusivism, to subjugate. It is in the nature of
generative theory to offer a means, a venue, of liberation. What
would be more hospitable to the ethical impulses of the profession of social work?
Finally, what profession is more comfortable with narrative,
story, the meaning of the moment for the client, than social
work? Our history is rich with respect for the narrative accounts
of others, although fears of not being scientifically respectable
may have made us more tentative in this regard. As Howard
Goldstein (1986) suggests:
The task of both the worker and the client is to develop... a

theory in collegial fashion, as they join together in pursuit of
understanding and meaning that is relevant to the client's life (my
emphasis, p. 46).
In describing the oral, preliterate culture of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), a former alcoholic (Elpenor, a pseudonym) talked of
the absolute importance of narrative and story-telling as a kind
of generative theory for the needy alcoholic wanting to sober up.
In the rooms, then, where AA people tell their stories, there are
really two dramas going on, the events recounted in the narrative
and the narrator's struggle to recover his experience to build a
new ladder of word on firmer footing. The story emerges rung by
rung, sometimes as farce, sometimes as melodrama: a situation
comedy or horror show. Often it is both (1986, p. 46).
Without narrative, the "bottomless neediness" and "wondrous
hopes" of the newly sober individual remain just that, and the
bottle becomes the only means of sating both. Narrative and
story-telling are important to all clients; we, as social workers
should know. Perhaps, as Schon implies, the central activity of
the professional is framing, "setting" problems in phenomenal
terms that generate movement, interest, and possibility. In other
words, what we offer the client are grounds and language for
a more plausible, action-freeing narrative. For the drinker, the
narrative of possibility is the one that bathes the past in unique
meaning and frames the future with palpable hope; we should
wish no less for those we presume to help.
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